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SHORT HISTORY OF CONSTANT TURMOIL

BETWEEN METALCLAD CORPORATION AND THE
MUNICIPALITY OF GUADALCAZAR

Metalclad, an American Corporation, did not begin to consider entry into the hazardous industrial waste industry in Mexico
until the late 1980s. 1 By the mid 1990s, research revealed that
Mexico generated over ten million tons of industrial waste annually, while only an estimated ten percent of this waste may have
been treated in accordance with international environmental
standards.2 The remaining waste was either stored on site or illegally dumped elsewhere.' Moreover, there were only two facilities
in the entire country equipped to dispose of this hazardous waste
1. See Lucien J. Dhooge, The North American Free Trade Agreement and the
Environment: The Lessons of Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, 10
MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 209, 229 (2001).
2. See id.
3. See id.
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in conformance with international standards.4 One of these sites
is located nine hours away from Mexico's primary industrial
areas, where seventy percent of the country's hazardous waste is
generated; and the other site, partially due to its limited disposal
capabilities, only accepts hazardous waste generated within its
State boundaries. 5 Due to this predicament, "representatives of
the Mexican government, Mexican industry, and both national
and international organizations were in agreement that 'waste
treatment and disposal [was] one of the most urgent national
development problems.' ' 6 In light of this unfortunate quagmire,
one can easily see why Metalclad viewed entry into the Mexican
hazardous waste disposal industry as brimming with potential for
increased economic growth, capital and revenue.7
Initially owned by Mexican nationals, a company by the name
of Coterin built and operated a hazardous waste transfer station
within the municipality of Guadalcazar (the Municipality), in the
State of San Luis Potosi (the State), Mexico.8 Notably, the Municipality did not require Coterin to obtain a permit of any kind prior
to the construction and operation of the transfer station.' In less
than two years of operation, however, the Federal Government of
Mexico shut down the site. ° Soon thereafter, Coterin applied to
the Municipality for a permit to construct a hazardous waste landfill at the site in 1991, but the application was denied. 1 Additionally, a newly elected municipal government came into office in
1992 and confirmed this 1991 permit refusal. 2 In spite of this
refusal, in January of 1993, Coterin received two permits from
federal agencies regarding the development of a hazardous waste
landfill at the site, and one permit from the State with respect to
land use for a landfill. 3 It is here that Metalclad made its first
significant move into the Mexican hazardous waste disposal
industry. In April of the same year, the permits were issued and
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See Arturo Borija Tamayo, The New Federalism, Internationalizationand
PoliticalChange in Mexico: A TheoreticalAnalysis of the Metalclad Case, Doc. No. 59,
CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION Y DOCENCIA ECONOMicAs 8 (1998).

7. See Dhooge, supra note 1, at 229.
8. See id. at 38; See The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, 89

B.C.L.R.3d 359 (Can. 2001) [hereinafter Appeal].
9. See Dhooge, supra note 1, at 232.
10. Appeal, supra note 8, para. 5.
11. Id. para. 6.
12. Id.
13. Id. para. 7.
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Metalclad signed an option agreement with Coterin to purchase
the company, including the proposed hazardous waste landfill
site.14 Significantly, the option agreement was contingent upon
either the issuance of a municipal permit to Coterin, or that
Coterin receive a definitive judgment from the Mexican courts
that a municipal permit was not required for the construction of a
hazardous waste landfill. 5 Metalclad contends, and the Governor
of the State denies, that it obtained the Governor's support for the
project at a meeting between the two.' 6 Further, other federal officials assured it that all of the necessary permits had been issued
for the operation of the landfill except for one permit, which
Metalclad would later acquire within the year. 7
Shortly thereafter, Metalclad completed its purchase of
Coterin without either of the conditions being satisfied according
to the terms of the initial option agreement. s However, because
Mexican federal officials promised that Coterin possessed all of
the authority needed to undertake the landfill project, Metalclad
believed that the underlying purpose for the conditions had been
met. 9 Furthermore, due to these same federal assurances, Metalclad commenced construction at the site in the absence of a municipal construction permit.2" Not only did federal and state officials
inspect the site throughout the construction process, but Metalclad also provided officials with written status reports of its progress.2 Yet, much to Metalclad's surprise, late in 1994, the
Municipality issued a stop work order due to the lack of a municipal construction permit.22 After further representations by the
Federal Government that "the Municipality lacked any basis for
denying the construction permit... [and] the Municipality would
issue the permit as a matter of course," Metalclad immediately
applied for the municipal permit in order "to facilitate an amicable
relationship with the Municipality," and then the corporation recommenced construction of the facility.2 3 In the interim, Metalclad received yet another construction permit from the Federal
14. Id. para. 8.

15. Id.
16. See Metalclad Corp v. The United Mexican States, Award of Aug, 30, 2000,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001) [hereinafter Award].
17. See Appeal, supra note 8, paras. 5-6.

18. Id.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See id.
See id. para. 6.
Award, supra note 16, para. 39.
Id. para. 40.
Id. para. 41.
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Government authorizing construction of the final aspects of the
facility.2 4 Around the same time, two independent environmental
studies were completed, confirming earlier findings that the site
was suitable for a hazardous waste landfill with proper
engineering.25
Construction of the landfill was completed in March of 1995.
Metalclad attempted to host a grand opening party, but was
thwarted by demonstrators who blockaded the site, preventing
guests from entering the facility and causing considerable
upheaval.26 Consequently, the site never opened.27 Still hopeful,
Metalclad commenced months of further negotiations with federal
authorities.28 The State was invited to participate in the negotiations, but declined to do SO. 2 9 Finally, believing to have reached
the light at the end of the tunnel, an agreement called The Convenio was reached between Metalclad and federal authorities in
November 1995.10 The Convenio contained numerous provisions
ensuring that environmental and human safety precautions would
be given ample attention, and specific procedures were designed
with this in mind." Additionally, Metalclad also promised to commit significant resources to matters and organizations within the
local community; such as waste disposal discounts, free medical
care, employment preferences for local inhabitants, and sponsorship of educational courses for governmental employees, to name
just a few.32 Not persuaded by the numerous beneficial provisions
contained within the agreement, however, and foreboding what
would soon come, the Governor denounced The Convenio shortly
after it was presented to the public.33 Then, in December 1995,
thirteen months after Metalclad first applied, and after numerous
federal assurances and actions to the contrary, the Municipality
officially denied Metalclad's request for a construction permit. 4
The facts surrounding the denial of the municipal permit
must be given special attention. First, there was not one instance
where a federal authority required, or even considered, the need
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 9.
Award, supra note 16, para. 44.
Id. para. 45-46.
Id. para. 46.
See id. para. 47.
Id. para. 49.
Id. para. 47.
See id. para. 48.
Id.
Id. para. 49.
Id. paras. 50-52.
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for Metalclad to obtain a municipal permit throughout all of the
numerous regulatory transactions, permitting processes, and
negotiations in which the corporation engaged with the Federal
Government.3 5 In fact, the Federal Government assured Metalclad that it had obtained all of the authority and approval
required on many occasions. 6 Second, "there was no evidence that
the Municipality ever required or issued a municipal construction
permit for any other construction project in Guadalcazar['s history] ."3 Third, "there was no evidence [of] an established administrative process with respect to municipal construction permits in
Fourth, the extraordinary length of time
the Municipality ....,,3'
(over a year) it took the Municipality to reject Metalclad's applica3
Fifth, Metalclad never received notice or an
tion for the permit9.
invitation to attend the Town Council meeting where its application for the permit was discussed and ultimately refused.4 °
Finally, even if it is assumed that a municipal permit was
required, the Municipality's basis for denial of the permit was not
within its constitutionally defined grant of authority.4 1
[Als to hazardous waste evaluations and assessments, the
federal authority's jurisdiction [is] controlling and the authority of
the municipality only extend[s] to appropriate construction considerations. Consequently, the denial of the permit by the Municipality by reference to environmental impact considerations
[regarding] . . .what was basically a hazardous waste disposal
landfill was improper ... as was [the denial of a] permit for any
reason other than those related to the physical construction or
defects in [a] site.42
Mexico's General Ecology Law of 1988 expressly grants the
power to authorize construction and operation of hazardous waste
landfills to the Federal Government. 43 Additionally, Mexican Law
also limits the environmental powers of municipalities to issues
regarding non-hazardous waste.4 4 In spite of the Municipality's
narrow scope of authority to grant or deny permits limited to
physical construction considerations, the Municipality refused to
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. para. 52.
Id. paras. 87-89.
Id. para. 52
Id.
See id. para. 50.
Id. para. 54.
Id. paras. 81-86.
Id. para. 86.
See id. para. 82.
See id. para. 83.
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grant Metalclad a permit. The Municipality based its decision on
"the opposition of the local population, the fact that construction
had already begun when the application was submitted, the
denial of the permit to Coterin in... 1991 and ...1992, and the
ecological concerns regarding the environmental effect and impact
on the site and surrounding communities."'4 5 In short, the denial
of the construction permit was not grounded in a legitimate exercise of the Municipality's authority.
Attempting further measures, the Municipality then turned
to the Mexican court system to obtain a court order preventing the
operation of the landfill. 46 The judicial actions were successful in
temporarily postponing Metalclad's operations, but the matters
were eventually thrown out of the courts for lack of standing. 47 As
if blind to all of the turmoil between the Municipality and Metalclad, the Federal Government, in February 1996, issued yet
another permit increasing the annual permitted waste capacity of
the facility from 36,000 tons per year to 360,000 tons per year.'
As a final attempt, Metalclad requested once more that the
Municipality reconsider its application for a permit, but it was
again denied.4 9
The Municipality's second denial of a construction permit
proved to be the straw that broke the camel's back. After an
unsuccessful attempt at negotiations, Metalclad finally initiated
arbitral proceedings against the Government of Mexico under
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) on January 1997 with the Additional Facility Rules of
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID)5 An arbitral tribunal was chosen, and soon thereafter
the Tribunal determined the place of the arbitration to be Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada."'
Further sealing the fate of an already sufficiently battered
and bruised investment, one last and final blow was thrown at
Metalclad by the Governor three days before his term of office
expired. 2 After the arbitral proceedings were underway, but
before the hearing in the arbitration was held, the Governor
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. para. 92.
See id. para. 95; see Appeal, supra note 8, para. 14.
See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 15; see Award, supra note 16, para. 95.
See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 12.
See id. para. 13.
See id. para. 16.
See id. para. 18.
See id. para. 17.
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issued an Ecological Decree in September 1997 declaring an area
within the Municipality, that included the landfill site, an ecological preserve for the purpose of protecting various species of cacti.5"
Needless to say, the Decree effectively and permanently prevented
any operation of the landfill now, or in the future.54

II.

NAFTA's FIRST CHAPTER 11 ARBITRATION

Metalclad initially brought forth numerous claims against
Mexico (on behalf of the Municipality and the State) for its treatment with respect to the landfill. The outcome of the NAFTA arbitration resulted in a damages award to be paid by Mexico to
Metalclad Corporation in the amount of $16,685,000 (U.S.).5 5
Mexico, unhappy with the Tribunal's decision, appealed to have
the award set aside, arguing that the Tribunal decided issues
beyond its scope. 56 As a result, for the first time since NAFTA's
enactment, a Chapter 11 Arbitral Award was granted an appeal.
In accordance with NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration procedure
and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules governing this litigation,
the appeal of the NAFTA Arbitral Award was brought in the same
State as where the arbitration took place." Canada was the host
State of the arbitral decision in Metalclad Corporation v. The
United Mexican States, and it is here that Mexico stated its case.58
In this landmark appeal, the Supreme Court of British Columbia
predominantly upheld the damages award ordering the Mexican
government to compensate Metalclad Corporation for NAFTA violations. In doing so, however, it overturned two of the three Tribunal holdings. 9
The Tribunal first held, and the Supreme Court of British
Columbia (B.C.) overruled, that Metalclad was not given the minimum standard of treatment promised by the Parties in Article
53. Id.
54. Award, supra note 16, para. 59.
55. See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 1.
56. See id. paras. 1, 52.
57. See id. para. 1; see generally Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, arts. 50-53, 17
U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090 (providing very limited protection against outside court
review in accordance with national law relating to court review of international
arbitral awards, since it is the law of the host state that governs actions to set awards
aside). See, e.g., New York Convention on the Recognition of Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, art. 5, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. 6997.
58. See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 1.
59. See id. para. 133.
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1105 of Chapter 11.60 Next, the Tribunal held that Mexico expropriated Metalclad's investment through contradictory, unpredictable, and unclear behavior. 1 This behavior, the Tribunal held,
was violative of the minimum standards of treatment towards
investors. 62 In other words, when the Mexican State and Municipal governmental actions were viewed in their entirety, the Tribunal found that the government took measures against Metalclad
that were unfair and had an effect tantamount to expropriation
prohibited under Articles 1105 and 1110.63 Believing it relied too
heavily on the first "erroneous" finding of a breach of Article 1105,
the Court consequently overruled the second Tribunal holding
that found a breach of Article 1110.1 Finally, the Tribunal held,
and the B.C. Supreme Court affirmed, that Metalclad was prevented from opening and operating its hazardous waste landfill
site due to an Ecological Decree that, once enacted, indirectly
expropriated the hazardous waste facility by the Mexican government.6 5 Consequently, Metalclad lost all of its investment pertaining to the site, and the Decree was found by both the Tribunal and
the B.C. Supreme Court to be a breach of Article 1110 of Chapter
11 of NAFTA.66
Metalclad, as with all Chapter 11 Arbitrations, needs perspective: even though the damages award was not significantly
altered by the Supreme Court's decision, 67 its significance lies
more in what it overrules, than in what it sustains. As this note
will argue, familiarity with the legislative background, objectives,
and context of NAFTA adds dimension to, and exposes the Court's
superficial, shortsighted, and categorical analysis of the issues
involved within the Tribunal's award. Its most opprobrious flaw
is that the B.C. Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction and should not
have granted itself authority to hear the appeal in the first place.
Thus, this historic decision takes its form against a backdrop of
subsequent Chapter 11 Arbitral interpretations, a wealth of treaties, agreements, and international and local law that all require
consideration.
Part III of this note examines the B.C. Supreme Court's claim
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id. para. 65, 133.
See Award, supra note 16, paras. 107-108.
See id. paras. 104-108.
Id. para. 104.
See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 133.
See id. para. 35.
See id.; See Award, supra note 16, paras. 109-110.
See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 133.

2002]

THE NAFTA METALCLAD APPEAL

197

of jurisdiction to hear the Metalclad appeal. Part IV provides
some background and a brief history of NAFTA arbitral procedure. Part V reviews the legislative intent, history, language, and
meaning of Article 1105, also known as the Minimum Standard of
Treatment provision. Part VI analyzes the B.C. Supreme Court's
basis for overruling the Tribunal. Part VII briefly discusses the
recent clarification of NAFTA's Investor-State provision enacted
soon after this appeal was decided. Finally, this case note concludes with a brief critique and summation of the potential effects
the B.C. Supreme Court's decision will have on future NAFTA
Investor-State arbitrations.
III.

THE CLAIM OF JURISDICTION BY THE SUPREME COURT
OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Before commencement of any discussion regarding the conflicting holdings between the B.C. Supreme Court and the Tribunal, it is of paramount importance to first evaluate the relevant
Canadian law that governs grants to hear appeals, such as the
Metalclad award. This is essential because Canadian public policy requires its courts to defer to the judgments made by international arbitrators in their decisions, except in very limited
circumstances. 8 The relevant Canadian standard of review pertaining to this matter is found within Section 5 of the International Commercial ArbitrationAct (the Act), and reads as follows:
In matters governed by this Act,
(a) a court must not intervene [in an arbitral award] unless
so provided in this Act, and
(b) an arbitral proceeding of an arbitral tribunal or an
order, ruling or arbitral award made by an arbitral tribunal
must not be questioned, reviewed or restrainedby a proceeding under the JudicialProcedureAct or otherwise except to
the extent provided in this Act.69
Notably, Subsection 34(2) of the Act outlines the "only" conditions
that must be present in order to enable a disputing party to seek
68. See The International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 233, § 5,
s. 34; see also Quintette Coal Limited v. Nippon Steel Corporation, B.C.C.A. 1 W.W.R.
219, 229 (1991) (holding that, "as a matter of policy, [the court should] adopt a
standard which seeks to preserve the autonomy of the forum selected by the parties
and to minimize judicial intervention when reviewing international commercial
arbitral awards in British Columbia.").
69. See The International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 233, § 5,
s. 34 (emphasis added).
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recourse from a court in Canada against an arbitral award. The
pertinent portion regarding the immediate case reads as follows:
An arbitral award may be set aside by the Supreme Court
only if:
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration . ..
To add further depth and understanding to the B.C. Court's standard of review when granting itself jurisdiction to set aside international tribunal awards, and to highlight the essential
components required in the Court's analysis that are necessary to
overrule, Justice Tysoe cites in his opinion the leading British
Columbia authority on Subsection 34(1) (quoted above), Quintette
Coal Limited v. Nippon Steel Corporation,1 W.W.R. 219 (B.C.C.A.
1991). 71 In doing so, he appears to acknowledge that it is not the
role of a court to second-guess an arbitral interpretation of provisions within a contract. Further, Justice Tysoe admits that in
Quintette Coal, the B.C. Court of Appeal refused to interfere with
an arbitral award, and in doing so, it also stated that unless an
award "contains decisions beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration," the court will not have jurisdiction to set the award
aside, "even if it can be shown that the arbitration tribunal has
erred in interpreting the contract.7 2 But the Appeals Court did
not stop there. Notably, they explicitly continue by stating that as
long as "[a tribunal's] interpretation is one which the words of the
contract can reasonably bear," the interpretation must not be set
aside.7 3
In light of this legislative history and leading judicial interpretation, the B.C. Supreme Court's decision to overturn the first
two Tribunal holdings stands on rather dubious footing. Curiously, the B.C. Supreme Court explicitly cites within its opinion,
as support, the very same authority it should have used to refuse
to hear Mexico's appeal. 74 In order to fit within the Canadian
jurisdictional requirements to overturn the Tribunal's holding,
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Appeal, supra note 8, para. 51.
73. Quintette Coal Limited v. Nippon Steel Corporation, 1 W.W.R. 219, 229-30
(B.C.C.A. 1991).
74. See Appeal, supra note 8, paras. 18-20.
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Justice Tysoe had to make two findings. First, that the Metalclad
Tribunal went beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration
by interpreting the provisions of Chapter 11 the way it did.75 Second, and of equal importance, that in light of Quintette, the Tribunal's interpretation was so nonsensical that the language within
the relevant portions of NAFTA could not "reasonably bear" the
meaning the Tribunal gave them.76 So, let us see where these outlandish interpretations reside.
IV.

AN OVERVIEW OF NAFTA's CHAPTER
ARBITRAL PROCEDURE

11

The Metalclad Arbitration is the first NAFTA award to grant
compensation for damages to a private investor under the provisions of Chapter 11."1 In order to fully realize the cursory analysis
applied by the B.C. Supreme Court in both its grant of appeal, and
its final opinion, a brief summary of the duties of a NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral tribunal is necessary. Absent specific definitions
and intent behind the language within NAFTA, it becomes the tribunal's job to interpret NAFTA's meaning. 8 Significantly, by
signing NAFTA, each Party has explicitly consented to the arbitral procedures set forth within the Agreement. 9 This consent
includes a grant of power to the arbitral body that enables the
tribunal to define the relevant provisions of NAFTA. This is
important because the disputing parties are subsequently bound
by the tribunal's interpretations with respect to the issues in controversy and to the final award the tribunal will ultimately
reach.8 ° Although NAFTA awards are not binding as precedent,
the analysis applied can have a major impact on how the Agreement is understood and operates in practice. 1 Accordingly, no single award becomes "law" in terms of its interpretation of the
NAFTA provisions at issue. International tribunals often consider
the reasoning advanced by other tribunals in making their decisions, however, and depending on the weight this reasoning is
given by the deciding tribunal, the prior award may help in shaping the interpretation given to the same provisions at issue in a
75. See id. para. 52.
76. See id.
77. See Dhooge, supra note 1, at 77.
78. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, art. 102(2)-1131(1),
107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
79. See id. art. 1122.
80. See id. art. 1136.
81. See id.
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present claim. 2 It is important to note that the individuals chosen
to lead NAFTA arbitration panels are world-renowned and
respected international legal scholars, and experts in the field of
international law. In contrast, Justice Tysoe's expertise is most
under Canadian law,
likely vested in judicial analysis of matters
83
Columbia.
British
of
that
particularly
Chapter 11 of NAFTA focuses on the free and nondiscriminatory treatment of investors and investments.8 Many concepts and
terms within NAFTA are taken from the global trade law system
that was previously called the GATT system. This system was
revised and condensed during the Uruguay Rounds of negotiations in 1994, culminating with the creation of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). 5 Because the Uruguay Round of the WTO
negotiations did not include an extensive code on private investments, NAFTA distinguishes itself from the Uruguay Rounds
because the Parties involved did include such a code." It is within
Chapter 11 that a broad ranging set of rights and remedies are
specifically established for individuals and enterprises from any
country party to NAFTA" Thus, the Agreement provides protection for these private investors, and all of their investments
located within any other country party to NAFTA."8 Notably, private parties may only arbitrate claims of breaches found within
the provisions of Chapter 11.89 NAFTA restricts private parties
from arbitrating claims with respect to alleged breaches of other
provisions of the Agreement. Under those circumstances, the
investor would not have an independent right to bring a claim.
Therefore, it can only be brought on the investor's behalf by its
host country to be decided under the provisions set forth in Chaptei 20.90 This distinction is important because Mexico claims in its
appeal to the B.C. Supreme Court that "the tribunal made decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration
82. See David A. Gantz, Reconciling EnvironmentalProtection and Investor Rights
under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 31 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10646 (June 2001).
83. Todd Weiler, Canadian Court's Review of Decision by NAFTA Panel Against
Mexico Raises More Questions than Answers: An Interview with NAFTA Legal Expert
Todd Weile, 9:5 LATIN AM.LAW & Bus. RP-r 18, 19 (May 2001).
84. See NAFTA, supra note 78, ch. 11, 1099-1127.
85. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, 19-22 (Nov. 12, 2000)
(Schwartz, J., concurring).
86. See id.
87. See NAFTA, supra note 78, ch. 11, 1099-1127.
88. See id.
89. See id. ch. 11 sec. B.
90. See id.
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by deciding upon matters outside [of] Chapter 11.""
To be sure, Chapter 11 has three primary objectives:
(1) to establish a secure investment environment through
the elaboration of clear rules of fair treatment of foreign
investment and investors; (2) to remove barriers to investment by eliminating or liberalizing existing restrictions;
and (3) to provide an effective means for the resolution of
disputes between an investor and the host government.92
These objectives are met through the establishment of six basic
protections for NAFTA private investors:"
(1) Article 1110 - Expropriation
(2) Article 1102 - National Treatment
(3) Article 1103 - Most Favored Nation Treatment
(4) Article 1105 - Minimum Standard of Treatment
(5) Article 1106 - Performance Requirements
(6) Article 1114 - Environmental Measures
As noted above, the Metalclad award is limited to issues
encompassed by Articles 1110 and 1105. For the purposes of this
note, however, discussion will be limited to the B.C. Supreme
Court decision that overturned the Tribunal's finding of a breach
of Article 1105.
V.

ARTICLE

1105

-

MINIMUM STANDARD

TREATMENT UNDER

OF

NAFTA

Let us now turn to the Tribunal's first holding. The Tribunal
found that Mexico violated Article 1105 by not affording Metalclad
treatment in accordance with the minimum standards agreed
upon by all of the NAFTA Parties.94 Article 1105(1) provides:
"Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another
Party treatment in accordance with international law, including
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security."95
The significance of Article 1105 of the NAFTA lies in the "extra"
protection it provides private investors from what would otherwise be a major gap in the Agreement if they were left only to rely
on the protections offered in other portions of NAFTA. In other
words, a government might treat a foreign investor in an unjust
91.
92.
216.
93.
94.
95.

Appeal, supra note 8, para. 67.
See NAFTA, supra note 78, ch. 11, 1099-1127; See Dhooge, supra note 1, at
See NAFTA, supra note 78, ch. 11, sec. A.
See Award, supra note 16, paras. 100-01.
NAFTA, supra note 78, art. 1105.
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and injurious fashion, yet at the same time be treating that investor in the same manner that it treats its own nationals and/or
every other foreign investor. Therefore, the Party would not be
breaching Article 1102 (National Treatment) or 1103 (Most
Favored Nation Treatment) of NAFTA, but it would be breaching
Article 1105. "Article 1105 imports into the NAFTA the international law requirements of due process, economic rights, obligations of good faith and natural justice."9 6 Thus, Article 1105
provides a floor of protection for private investments under which
a Party to NAFTA may not fall below. Due to this gap filler, it is
easy to see how circumstances occasionally are such where "[t]he
existence of a minimum international standard means that in the
eyes of international law, non-nationals might have rights and
remedies that to some extent exceed those of nationals."97 A clear
example of this has been cited above. Under those circumstances,
a State to a NAFTA Party would be compelled to treat a private
investor from another NAFTA Party to a minimum standard of
treatment above that given to its own nationals, other foreign
investors, and both of their investments.
As stated briefly above, the Tribunal found that Mexico's
behavior with respect to the landfill violated the requirements of
"fair and equitable treatment." In order for the B.C. Supreme
Court to interfere with this finding on appeal however, Justice
Tysoe must establish that the Tribunal's holding was "beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration" and was based upon a textual interpretation so unreasonable that the meaning given to the
Article's explicit terms is beyond "that which the words of the contract could reasonably bear." In the Tribunal's holding, it first
addressed Mexico's responsibility for the acts of its States and
Municipalities.9 8 By citing to various authority, including customary international law, the Tribunal noted that "Mexico . .. proceed[ed] on the assumption that the normal rule of State
responsibility applies; that is, that the Respondent can be internationally responsible for the acts of State organs at all three levels
of government."99 Justice Tysoe appears to have no problem with
96. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://
www.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm, at 29 (last visited Nov. 12, 2002) [hereinafter
S.D. Myers Partial Award].
97. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, para. 75 (Nov. 12, 2000)
(Schwartz, J., concurring).
98. See Award, supra note 16, para. 73.
99. Id.
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this first finding. 0 0 After establishing the Federal Government's
responsibility for the actions at issue, however, the Tribunal then
addressed whether Metalclad's investment was denied "treatment
in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security."'' To begin with, the
Tribunal briefly mentions the prominence of the principle of transparency found throughout NAFTA. 0 2 It first cited to explicit references of 3 transparency found in Article 102 - NAFTA
10
Objectives.
Article 102(2) of NAFTA obliges the Parties to "interpret and
apply the provisions of [the] Agreement in the light of its objectives set out in Paragraph 1 and in accordance with the applicable
rules of international law." 4 The relevant objectives set out in
Paragraph 1 (Articlel02(1)) are as follows:
The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through its principles and rules, including national
treatment, most-favored-nation treatment and transparency, are to:...
(b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade
area;
(c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the
territoriesof the Parties; ...
(e) create effective procedures for the implementation and
application of this Agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes; and
(f) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional
and multilateral co-operation to expand and enhance
the benefits of this
Agreement.'0 5
Furthermore, Chapter 11 arbitrators are required by Article
1131(1) to "decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this
0 6 Although
Agreement and applicable rules of international law.""
not specifically referred to by the Tribunal, but certainly relevant
in this regard, are the objectives found in the NAFTA preamble,
where yet another reference to the concept of transparency can be
100. See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 29 (". . . the acts of the State of SLP and the
Municipality (which were attributable to Mexico), failed to comply with or adhere to
the requirements of Article 1105."). Id.
101. See Award, supra note 16, para. 74.
102. Id. para. 76.
103. Id.
104. NAFTA, supra note 78, art. 102(2).
105. Id. art. 102(1) (emphasis added).
106. Id. art. 1131(1).
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found. "The preamble is [the] part of... NAFTA that is of assistance in understanding the objects and meaning of specific
detailed provisions."'0 7 Portions of the NAFTA Preamble state
that the Parties involved have agreed to:
STRENGTHEN the special bonds of friendship and cooperation among their nations;
CONTRIBUTE to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade and provide a catalyst to broader international cooperation;
REDUCE distortions to trade;
ENSURE a predictable commercial framework for business
planning and investment;
BUILD on their respective rights and obligations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other multilateral and bilateral instruments of cooperation;
UNDERTAKE each of the preceding in a manner consistent with environmental protection;
PROMOTE sustainable development;
STRENGTHEN the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations."0 '
By considering the Agreement in its entirety, a tribunal must
first start by identifying the meaning of the words in the context
that they appear within NAFTA. 1°9 In doing so, a tribunal must
also place particular importance on the object and purpose of the
contract, including its preamble, the general objectives stated in
the text, and any annexes. 110 For this purpose, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties"' is an influential tool used by
international arbitrators in deciding issues that are before them.
Article 31(1)12 provides that:
107. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, (Nov. 12, 2000) (Schwartz,
J., concurring).
108. See NAFTA, supra note 78, pmbl.
109. See Todd Weiler, A First Look at the Interim Merits Award in S.D. Myers, Inc.
v. Canada: It is Possible to Balance Legitimate Environmental Concerns with
Investment Protection, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 173 (2001) at 182
("Successive NAFTA tribunals have declared that the NAFTA's terms must be

interpreted in good faith, in accordance with their ordinary meaning, in the context
within which they appear, and in light of the objects and purposes of the treaty."). Id.
110. See generally id.
111. NAFTA, supra note 78, art. 102(2); see also The Vienna Convention on the Law

of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31 & 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention] (requiring under Article 32 that preparatory work and
circumstances of its conclusion are to be referred to as a supplementary means of
interpretation when interpretation under Article 31 "leaves the meaning ambiguous
or obscure; or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.").
112. Vienna Convention, supra note 111, art. 31.
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A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made
between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more of the
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty." 3
In the same vein, Article 271" provides that a State party to a
treaty may not invoke the provisions of the internal law as justification for its failure to perform the treaty.
With this in mind, the Tribunal gave its interpretation of
what it understood the reference of "transparency" to mean in
light of its context within NAFTA, considering the Agreement's
overall objectives. In doing so, a logical interpretation of 1105
included a transparency element as well. In the Tribunal's view,
objectives of transparency are interwoven within the entire text,
and to interpret 1105 without it would result in an interpretation
contrary to NAFTA's purpose. Under this interpretation, the Tribunal defined transparency to include "the idea that all relevant
legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing and
successfully operating investments made, or intended to be made
... should be capable of being readily known to all affected investors of another Party."1 5 The Tribunal went further to hold that
once a federal government becomes aware of any misunderstandings, it is their obligation "to ensure that the correct position is
promptly determined and clearly stated" so that investors may
proceed, confident that they are obeying all of the relevant laws. 6
Subsequently, the Tribunal held that Mexico failed to provide
1 17
Metalclad with such a clear and predictable environment.
In essence, the Municipality, through its illegitimate and
unprecedented behavior (particularly with respect to its requirement for a construction permit), pulled the rug out from under113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. art. 27.
Award, supra note 16, para. 76.
Id.
See id. paras. 99-101.
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neath Metalclad's investment. This unexpected and sudden
thwarting of its ability to open and operate the landfill was all the
more damaging because Metalclad had relied upon federal assurances that it had obtained all that was required to ensure a solid
footing to its investment."' Furthermore, even though the Federal
Government was fully aware of its Municipal and State actions, it
failed to interfere or exercise any governmental authority to alleviate the resulting damage.'19 These contrary governmental
actions left Metalclad effectively whipsawed.'2 Therefore, after
considering the NAFTA text in its entirety, and stating that it
interpreted the language of Article 1105 to be conscious of a general principle of transparency, the Tribunal held that Mexico's
actions against Metalclad failed to meet the level of fairness and
equitable treatment expressly required within Chapter 11. As a
result, the Tribunal found that Mexico breached the requirements
of Article 1105.121
VI.

THE BRITISH COLUMBIAN SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
AND OVERRULE OF THE ARBITRATION

Justice Tysoe disagrees with the Tribunal's finding that a
government's failure to act in a clear, predictable, and transparent
manner can constitute a breach of the "fair and equitable treatment" standard contained within Article 1105. He construes "fair
and equitable treatment" to be limited to protections found only
within "customary international law,"122 and his overruling of the
Tribunal's holding with respect to 1105 rests on three main components. First, Justice Tysoe is critical of the Tribunal's analysis
because "no authority was cited or evidence introduced to establish that transparency has become part of customary international
law ,"123 and he takes a categorical approach that the Tribunal
should only have looked to "customary international law" in its
interpretation. 124 Second, the Court states that the Tribunal inappropriately incorporated portions found in Chapter 18 of NAFTA
118. See
119. See
120. Id.
permits to

id. paras. 87-89.
id.
The Federal Government was repeatedly giving assurances and granting
Metalclad simultaneously as the State and Municipal governments were

denying permit requests and doing everything in their power (and then some) to try
and thwart any progress towards completion and operation of the landfill. Id.
121. Id. at 101.
122. See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 62.
123. Id. para. 68.
124. See id. para. 62.
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to support its reasoning and subsequent analysis of Chapter 11
provisions. 125 Finally, as a result of the two Tribunal actions stated
above, Justice Tysoe concludes that "the Tribunal made its decision on the basis of transparency, [and] [t] his was a matter beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitration because there are no

transparency obligations contained in Chapter

11. "1126

However, in

order to more fully appreciate the shortcomings of Justice Tysoe's
analysis, it is important that we unpack each of these three components carefully, with all of the previously discussed international and Canadian law, and the various portions of the NAFTA
text in mind.
The Court begins its discussion of 1105 by first agreeing with
three rationales discussed in Myers, a partial NAFTA arbitration
award issued shortly after the Metalclad award. 127 In Myers, the
Tribunal asserts that the protections found within 1105 fill "a
gap" that otherwise would exist between the protections offered to
private investors in Articles 1102 and 1103.128 Following this
assertion, the Myers Tribunal articulates its view of both what the
"proper approach" should be in interpreting Article 1105,129 and
what is required in order for a Party to be found guilty of "unfair
treatment" towards a private investor. 13 0 Justice Tysoe, in agreement with the Myers award, quotes the Tribunal at length regarding these three interpretations.13 ' According to the Myers
Tribunal (and Justice Tysoe), "Article 1105(1) expresses an overall
concept. The words of the Article must be read as a whole. The
phrases ... fair and equitable treatment ...and.., full protection
and security.., cannot be read in isolation. They must be read in
conjunction with the introductory phrase ... treatment in accordance with international law."'3 2 Further, the Myers Tribunal
"considers that a breach of Article 1105 occurs only when it is
shown that an investor has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the international perspective."1 33 But the Court's
citing of the Myers award in the present case fails to provide any
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. para. 71.
Id. para. 72.
See id. paras. 61-63.
See S.D. Myers Partial Award, supra note 96, para. 259.
See id. para. 262.
See id. para. 263.
See Appeal, supra note 8, paras. 61-63.
Id. at 23; see also S.D. Myers Partial Award, supra note 96, para. 262.
S.D. Myers Partial Award, supra note 96, para. 263.
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extra support for its argument that the Metalclad Tribunal went
beyond the scope of 1105. It is possible that the Metalclad Tribunal simply found that Mexico met the Myers level of "unacceptable
treatment." Hence, even though the Metalclad award preceded
the Myers award cited by the Court, the Tribunal's decision still
fits within the interpretation given to 1105 by the Myers Tribunal
that followed.
However, taking one small step beyond the Myers interpretation, Justice Tysoe advances his interpretation of 1105, maintaining that "treatment may be perceived to be unfair and inequitable
but it will not constitute a breach of Article 1105 unless it is treatment which is not in accordance with international law. ' 134 Yet,
this interpretation fails to acknowledge another equally essential
component required in NAFTA Arbitral analysis. NAFTA provisions must additionally be interpreted in light of the Agreement's
overall content, objectives, and purpose. 135 Notably, the Court is
conveniently silent regarding this consideration. Keeping in mind
that this is a highly speculative, amorphous, and constantly evolving field of law, there are no bright line rules that may be utilized
to weigh whether Mexico's actions are violative of customary
international law levels of fairness, even if NAFTA's context and
objectives are not taken into account. 36 Considering this, would
not a tribunal consisting of practitioners, experts, and scholars of
international law and agreements have a better understanding
and breadth of knowledge regarding what concepts and principles
are actually found within "customary international law," and
what the terms of the NAFTA mean in that context?137 Further134. Appeal, supra note 8, para. 62.
135. Vienna Convention, supra note 111, art. 31.
136. See Gantz, supra note 82, at 10650 ("Given the lack of clarity of customary
international law in this area, the scope of the protection afforded by the fair and
equitable treatment requirement is uncertain."); see also William T. Waren, Paying to
Regulate: A Guide to Methanex v. United States and NAFTA Investor Rights, 31
ENvTL. L. REP. 10986, 8 (Vol. XXXI, August 2001) (espousing that the terms national
treatment, minimum treatment, and expropriation are "undefined in NAFTA, and
international law provides little precise guidance as to their meaning. The tribunal
will have broad discretion to read the standards narrowly or broadly."); see also
Weiler, supra note 83, at 19 (stating that international law is an "ever-expanding

body").
137. See Gantz, supra note 82, at 10648 (asserting that "some of the best known

and most highly respected lawyers in North America (or elsewhere) have served or
are serving on NAFTA tribunals ....

"); see also Weiler, supra note 83, at 20 (stating

that the arbitrators are "experts" in international law, and referring to Sir Eli
Lauterpacht (who Chaired the Metalclad tribunal) as a "renowned international legal
scholar." He notes further, "the international arbitral community is not very large,
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more, Justice Tysoe completely neglects looking to the Agreement
itself as an interpretive vehicle to assist in attaching a more specific meaning to the terms found within its provisions (which the
Metalclad Tribunal appropriately did).
The Metalclad Tribunal not only considered international
law, but it also considered whether it was unfair and inequitable
for Mexico to violate the objectives, preamble, and other provisions of NAFTA. Yet, Justice Tysoe speaks of a sole requirement
of "treatment not in accordance with international law" as if that
is the only area the Tribunal should have looked in interpreting
the 1105 text. Further, it appears as though the Court also
assumes that there are crystal-clear parameters and definitions
regarding "fair and equitable treatment" found within "international law" that the Tribunal failed to follow. 138 It is here that Justice Tysoe slightly diverges from the Myers interpretation he cites
as support, for according to the Court's reasoning, the Tribunal
should have taken a categorical analysis of Article 1105 by interpreting the provisions in isolation from the rest of the NAFTA
text.'39 Not even the Myers Tribunal interpreted Article 1105 so
40
narrowly. 1
After what amounts to a substitution of his interpretation of
1105 over the interpretation of the Metalclad Tribunal (an action
he has no jurisdictional authority to take), Justice Tysoe proceeds
to discuss the interpretation given to 1105 by the arbitrators of
the Pope award,' another NAFTA decision that came shortly
after Metalclad. Significantly, the Pope Tribunal diverges from
the interpretation of 1105 that the Myers Tribunal espouses. The
Pope arbitrators adopt an "additive" interpretation of 1105, holding that investors are entitled to treatment in accordance with
international law, in addition to fair and equitable treatment and
and [Sir Eli Lauterpacht] is a leading member of it. By contrast, very few people are
likely to have heard of Justice Tysoe.").
138. See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 62.
139. See id. (Justice Tysoe never mentions interpreting the language of NAFTA by
considering the Agreement's purpose and objectives, or the text as a whole. In fact, he
even goes as far as to cut out the language that suggests a cumulative approach in all
of the references he cites for support.).
140. See S.D. Myers Partial Award, supra note 96, para. 292 ("The chapters of
NAFTA are part of a 'single undertaking.' There appears to be no reason in principle
for not following the same preference as in the WTO system for viewing different
provisions as cumulative and complementary.").
141. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, (Apr. 10,
2001), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2002)
[hereinafter Pope & Talbot III].
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full protection and security."' However, the Court disagrees with
the Pope interpretation by faulting the additive characterization
attached to the word "including" found within the text of Article
1105.111 First, Justice Tysoe blatantly asserts that to interpret the
word "including" additively results in a "virtually opposite meaning" than what the Parties intended.1" Further, after taking it
upon himself to deny the word an additive interpretation, Justice
Tysoe then refers to the Vienna Convention for support, stating,
"[the Pope Tribunal's] interpretation is contrary to Article 31(1) of
the Vienna Convention, which requires that terms of treaties be
given their ordinary meaning. '
According to Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, ' "include" is defined as "to take into account; to consider as
part of a whole; [and] to put in a total."14 7 With these definitions in
mind, it is not unreasonable to interpret "including" as having an
additive translation. Specifically as applied by the Pope Tribunal,
they, in essence, must have interpreted "including" in the following manner: that the fairness elements must also be "included," or
"take[n] into account." An equally legitimate interpretation could
also be: it is crucial that the fairness elements be "consider[ed] as
part of [the] whole" body of international law, and finally, "including" may be interpreted as an assurance that the fairness elements be "put in [the] total" when considering breaches of Article
1105. At a minimum, the word "including" found within the text
appears to at least emphasize the "fairness elements," and would
seem to stress an extra level of sensitivity to them. The alternative would be to assume that the words following "including" have
no significance. In short, if the fairness elements are already contained within principles of international law, why would the Parties bother to additionally refer to them? It is illogical to assume
that the Parties to NAFTA agreed to a provision where half of the
text consists of redundant language, entirely void of any ancillary

meaning. 148
Additionally, there are many substantial arguments for inter142. Id. paras. 110-118.
143. See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 65.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 923 (2d ed. 1983).
147. Id.
148. See Pope & Talbot III, supra note 141, paras. 105-118 (citing to various
authorities, the Pope tribunal provides a very convincing and solid argument for
adopting an additive approach to Art. 1105).
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preting 1105 in a fashion that pays special attention to the "fairness elements." Significantly, Chapter 11 incorporates norms
that have long been established within many Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BITs).' 49 BITs are treaties entered into between two
States. "BITs, like NAFTA, include assurances of nondiscriminatory treatment, treatment in accordance with a minimum international standard, a prohibition on trade-related investment
restrictions, and guarantees of compensation when expropriations
occur." 150 Norms regarding private investment protections that
are similar, and often identical, to principles that are recognized
in general international law are consistently found within most
BITs.'1 1
Compared to the excerpt cited below, it becomes obvious that
"the language of Article 1105 grew out of the provisions of BITs
negotiated by the United States and other industrialized countries. As Canada points out in the Pope arbitration, these treaties
are a "principal source" of the general obligations of States with
respect to their treatment of foreign investment." 2 The obligations embodied in various BITs are primarily taken from the
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of 1987.153 It provides the following: "Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in
no case be accorded treatment less than that required by interna54
tional law."
The opinion in the arbitral award of Pope, provides a very convincing argument for interpreting the language of Article 1105
consistently with the BITs. 1 As briefly mentioned above, the Tribunal in Pope interprets the meaning of Article 1105 as adopting
the additive character found in BITs with respect to the "fairness
elements" that are found in both contracts.15 6 Moreover, the Pope
149. See id. para. 110 (stating "that the language of Article 1105 grew out of the
provisions of bilateral commercial treaties negotiated by the United States and other
industrialized countries .... "); see S.D. Myers Partial Award, supra note 96, para.
259; see S.D. Myers, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, 17 (Nov. 12, 2000) (Schwartz,
J., concurring).
150. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, 23 (Nov. 12, 2000)
(Schwartz, J., concurring).
151. See id.
152. See Pope & Talbot III, supra note 141, para. 110.
153. Reprinted in K.J. VANDENVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT
TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE (Deventer, Netherlands 1992) (emphasis added).
154. Id. art. II 2.
155. See generally Pope & Talbot III, supra note 141.
156. Id. para. 111.
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Tribunal is not alone in this interpretation. Many established
international scholars and other authorities have adopted the
approach that the language found within BITs make the additive
interpretation the proper one.'57 According to Mann,
[T]he terms 'fair and equitable treatment' envisage conduct
which goes far beyond the minimum standard and afford
protection to a greater extent and according to a much more
objective standard than any previously employed form of
words... [A tribunal] will have to decide whether in all the
circumstances the conduct in issue is fair and equitable or
unfair and inequitable .... The terms are to be understood
and applied independently and autonomously. 5 '
This same interpretation of the "fairness elements" was also held
by UNCTAD, stating,
[T]his approach - fair and equitable treatment with full
protection and security on the one hand and treatment no
less favorable than that required by international law on
the other - suggests that the two sets of standards are not
necessarily the same .... Both standards may overlap significantly with respect to issues such as arbitrary treatment, discrimination and unreasonableness, but the
presence of a provision assuring fair and equitable treatment in an investment instrument does not automatically
incorporate the international minimum standard for foreign investors.'59
Dolzer and Stevens come to a similar conclusion by submitting
that,
[T]he fact that parties to BITs have considered it necessary
to stipulate this [fair and equitable treatment] standard as
an express obligation rather than relied on a reference to
international law and thereby invoked a relatively vague
concept such as the minimum standard, is probably evidence of a self-contained standard. Further, some treaties
refer to international law in addition to the fair and equitable treatment, thus
appearing complementary to the provi1 60
sions of the BITs.

It should also be noted that prior to the B.C. Supreme Court's
decision, this issue had come before various tribunals, and no
157. Id. para. 110.
158. F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
1981 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 244.
159. See Pope & Talbot III, supra note 141, n.105.
160. R. DOLZER & M. STEVENS, BiLATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 60 (1995)
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Party to NAFTA ever offered evidence that the NAFTA Parties
intended to reject the additive character of the BITs.16 ' First, why
would NAFTA Parties give more protection to other countries
through BITs than to each other through NAFTA, when the
United States, Mexico, and Canada share a closer relationship
with each other than to many countries with which they have
entered into BITs? "[I]t would be difficult to ascribe to the NAFTA
Parties an intent to provide each other's investments more limited
protections than those granted to other countries not involved
jointly in a continent-wide endeavor aimed, among other things,
at "increas [ing] substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties." 62
This is a highly relevant consideration when a tribunal is interpreting and applying various provisions of NAFTA in light of its
"context, object and purpose." One of NAFTA's primary goals
appears to be a guarantee to investors of a hospitable climate that
would provide significant insulation from political risk and incidents of unfair treatment.'6 3
Second, as already mentioned, Parties to NAFTA have signed
numerous BITs with other countries that do ascribe to the additive interpretation of the fairness elements. A contrary view of
the analogous provision found in Article 1105 would result in a
more limited right of NAFTA private investors to object to laws,
regulations, and administration than is accorded to host country
investors as well as those investors and investments from other
countries that have entered into BITs with a NAFTA Party.
Under these circumstances, Articles 1102 and 1103, which give
every NAFTA investor and investment the right to national treatment and most favored nation treatment, would be breached.
However, it would be uncertain as to whether a breach could be
found in Article 1105, the Article specifically designed to address
claims by investors of unfair and inequitable treatment. Therefore, as outlined above, to deny 1105 an additive interpretation in
some circumstances has the potential to lead to a judicially inefficient and ludicrous result that grates against the purpose of
NAFTA. Specifically, this would mean that Metalclad would be
required to look to Articles 1102 and 1103 rather than 1105
because Mexico may have entered into an agreement, such as a
BIT with another State or investor that offers more protection
161. Pope & Talbot III, supra note 141, para. 114.
162. Id. para. 115.
163. See generally NAFTA, supra note 78.
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than the "customary international law" standard of what is considered "fair and equitable treatment." This would be a highly
likely result, since most BITs adopt an additive approach to those
terms. 16 In this scenario, the party that has concluded such an
agreement would be a "more favored nation" and the NAFTA
Party (here, Mexico) would have violated either Article 1102, or
1103 in Chapter 11 anyway.
In spite of all of this legislative background and academic discourse supporting an additive interpretation of 1105, the Court
nevertheless decides that the word "including" cannot possibly
countenance an additive meaning. 165 In doing so, Justice Tysoe
supports his interpretation by referring to Article 31(1) of the
Vienna Convention,"' as he cites it, which requires "that the
terms of treaties be given their ordinary meaning.' 67 Of huge significance (and with some irony), in arguing the importance of deciphering the pertinent language found within international
contracts, Justice Tysoe fails to address the rest of the text found
within the Article he employs for support. For in addition to giving the terms found within treaties their "ordinary meaning,"
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention also provides that the
terms of the treaty be interpreted "in their context and in light of
[the treaty's] object and purpose ... in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes. "168 Once the additional requirements found within Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention are
discovered, it becomes strikingly more apparent that not only
should the Court have upheld the Tribunal's findings, but it also
becomes clear that the Court should not have granted itself standing under Canadian law to hear the appeal. By including transparency obligations, the Tribunal still interpreted Article 1105 in
a manner that the words could reasonably bear. As we proceed in
our analysis it will become more and more evident that what Justice Tysoe is actually arguing, is his interpretation of Article 1105,
over that of other tribunals' interpretation of 1105. As already
noted above, please recall that Canadian courts are not to secondguess arbitral interpretations, especially if the words can "reasonably bear" the interpretation given.'69
After supporting his interpretation of Article 1105 by dissect164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Supra notes 148-161 and accompanying text.
See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 65.
Vienna Convention, supra note 111, arts. 31 & 32.
See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 65.
Vienna Convention, supra note 111, art. 31(1).
See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 52.
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ing and misapplying various pieces of relevant authority and analysis, Justice Tysoe then answers in the affirmative to Mexico's
claim that the Tribunal "used NAFTA's transparency provisions
as a basis for finding a breach of Article 1105." 1° Since Justice
Tysoe interprets 1105 in isolation from the rest of NAFTA, and
also refuses to allow any additional protection than that given
under minimum international standards of customary international law, he subsequently concludes that principles of transparency are not consistently protected according to those
minimum standards. 171 Therefore, the Court held that the Metalclad Tribunal gave meaning to the text of Article 1105 beyond the
scope submitted to arbitration by basing their finding of a breach
of Article 1105 primarily on the concept of transparency, a concept
the Court interprets to only be found in other portions of
NAFTA. 172
The concept of transparency is also explicitly discussed in
Chapter 18 of the NAFTA. 173 Justice Tysoe complains that the Tribunal quoted from Article 1802 in outlining its reasoning and consideration of the applicable law as applied to the facts in the
Metalclad case, and that by citing Article 1802, "the Tribunal
incorrectly stated that transparency was one of the objectives of
NAFTA . . . . The principle of transparency is implemented
through the provisions of Chapter 18, not Chapter 11." 174 Article
1802 of Chapter 18 explicitly states:
1. Each Party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings of general application respecting any matter covered by this Agreement
are promptly published or otherwise made available in
such a manner as to enable interested persons and Parties to become acquainted with them.
2. To the extent possible, each Party shall
(a) publish in advance any such measures that it proposes to adopt; and
(b) provide interestedpersons and Parties a reasonable
opportunity to comment on such proposed measures.'7 5
Please note that Article 1802 explicitly refers to "interested per170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. para. 66.
See id.
See id. para. 67.
NAFTA, supra note 78, arts. 1802-1803.
Appeal, supra note 8, para. 71.
NAFTA, supra note 78, art.1802 (emphasis added).
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sons" and Parties. Thus, a private party such as Metalclad, is
entitled to the protections expressed in Chapter 18.
Next in its analysis, the Court mysteriously states that Article 102 (NAFTA Objectives) provides that NAFTA is to be interpreted and applied in light of the objectives it sets out. The Court
also asserts, however, that "it does not require" that all of the provisions of the NAFTA are to be interpreted in light of those principles and rules.176 But what are we to make of Justice Tysoe's
comment here? Why would a court, tribunal, Party, or anyone for
that matter, fail to interpret and apply the objectives of NAFTA in
deciding an issue under it? Furthermore, Article 102 may not
"require" consideration of NAFTA objectives when interpreting its
provisions, but it certainly does not forbid it. It is a reasonable
assumption that at a minimum, Article 102 encourages any relevant Party, arbitrator, or court to do so, and it would seem quite
reasonable that the Tribunal chose to consider NAFTA's objectives
while giving specificity to the meaning of "the fairness elements"
in 1105. Consequently, there are many problems with the Court's
statement. First, transparency is explicitly stated as an objective
in 102. Second, the concept of transparency is also evident in the
NAFTA preamble. Finally, transparency is once again reiterated
in Articles 1802 and 1803 by explicitly applying to Metalclad as an
"interested person."
As shown above, a certain degree of transparency is sprinkled
both explicitly and implicitly throughout the entire NAFTA text.
Therefore, in considering NAFTA's objectives, preamble, and
other annexes, the Tribunal did not "reach beyond its scope" in
order to include a minimum principle of procedural fairness and
transparency within the protections provided to investors in Article 1105. Further, even if one assumes that it was incorrect to
interpret a concept of transparency in Article 1105, it certainly is
an interpretation that the words can "reasonably bear." As a
result, the Court lacked the authority to overturn the Tribunal's
holding, especially considering that one of the explicit purposes of
NAFTA is to provide and encourage a more transparent and predictable framework for investors and investments.'7 7
The primary mistake in Justice Tysoe's analysis is that the
Tribunal did not hold that because Mexico breached the transparency provisions of NAFTA Chapter 18 (claims of a Chapter 18
breach may only be brought by a Party, not a private investor such
176. See Appeal, supra note 8, para. 71.
177. See NAFTA, supra note 78, at pmbl.
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as Metalclad), 75 that it owed compensation under Chapter 11.
Rather, the Tribunal was merely employing an international
approach that emphasizes contextual interpretation in its analysis.'79 This assists tribunals in giving specificity to general terms
found within various provisions of an international agreement.
Here, the Tribunal interpreted the international "fairness elements" of 1105 to include principles of transparency. It did so by
taking into account the underlying international values found
within NAFTA's text. "Different chapters of NAFTA are... part
of a single undertaking and there appears to be no reason in principle for not following the same preference as in the WTO system
for viewing different provisions as cumulative and complementary."1 80 This same view, that different chapters of NAFTA can
overlap, and that the rights provided within it may be cumulative,
has also been accepted by the NAFTA Tribunal in S.D. Meyers,
which stated, "International law obliges tribunals to look at the
object and purpose of a provision. ' 's' International law also
requires a tribunal to look at the context of a provision.8 2
For this purpose, the most immediate context for deciphering
the meaning behind the language within Chapter 11 would be to
look to the language chosen, and its purpose within the entire
NAFTA text itself. It becomes evident that the Agreement explicitly discusses the objective to promote principles of transparency
in various places. Therefore, Justice Tysoe's holding, that "there
are no transparency obligations contained in Chapter 11," 1' could
only have been reached by interpreting the text of Article 1105 in
isolation. Once again, this is a matter of interpretation. The
Court assumes the categorical and irrationally narrow position
that because transparency is referred to in Article 1802 and other
provisions of the NAFTA, it is impossible for it to be addressed
anywhere else.' This interpretation is inaccurate and illogical.
Moreover, a principle of procedural fairness and transparency is
178. See id. arts. 1116-1117 (limits claims brought by investors to only those within
Chapter 11. The Party, on the investor's behalf, must bring all others).
179. See Weiler, supra note 83, at 19 ("[the Tribunal was] employing an
international lawyer's approach to explaining how the "principle of transparency" can
be found throughout the ever-expanding body of international law, including other
provisions of the NAFTA text.").
180. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, 63 (Nov. 12, 2000)
(Schwartz, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 71.
182. Id. at 72.
183. Appeal, supra note 8, para. 72.
184. Id. at 71-72.
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not a "state of the art" concept, and is found, at least implicitly,
within minimal standards of customary international law.18 5 Furthermore, in light of all of the relevant legislative history discussed in this note, the terms found in 1105 can "reasonably bear"
an interpretation of some minimum principle of transparency.
Therefore, the Court should not have upset the NAFTA Tribunal's
finding because it had no standing under Canadian law to do so.
VII.

CLARIFICATION OF NAFTA's INVESTORSTATE PROVISION

This note cannot adequately be concluded without mentioning
briefly the clarification'8 6 announced by the NAFTA Parties
regarding the interpretations to be given Chapter 11 investor protections. The clarification is partially an attempt by the Parties to
narrow arbitral interpretations of what "fair and equitable treatment" entails. The relevant portions are as follows:
B. Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with
International Law
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of
aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be
afforded to investments of investors of another
Party.
2. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and
"full protection and security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is
required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of
another provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate
international agreement, does not establish that
there has been a breach of Article 1105(1).187
Even with the new clarification, the Tribunal's finding of an Article 1105 breach still holds its muster, albeit with less force. "The
addition of the word 'customary,' which is not included in the orig185. See WTO, Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12,
1998, 55 WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 183 (holding that "It is clear to us that Article X:3 of
GATT 1994 establishes certain minimum standards for transparency and procedural
fairness in the administration of regulations .. ").
186. See Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (Dept. of Foreign
Affairs and Int'l Trade July 31, 2001), available at httpJ/www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tnanac/NAFTA-Interpr-e.asp (last visited November 9, 2002) [hereinafter Interpretation
of Chapter 11].
187. Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
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inal Article 1105(1), should limit the standard of treatment to
well-established norms of treatment . . . .""I As previously mentioned, principles of procedural fairness and transparency are
found implicitly and explicitly throughout customary international law. Yet, this is an amorphous and oftentimes loosely
defined field.18 9 Under these circumstances, a tribunal is obliged
to turn to NAFTA to further define its text where customary international law is somewhat unclear. Further, where one holding
will result in a finding perfectly in line with NAFTA's objectives
and intent, and a contrary holding will result in a finding opposed
to them, an interpretation considering the text of NAFTA in addition to customary international law to come to the former result
does not violate the clarification.
Significantly, the Parties chose the phrase, "do[es] not
require" when clarifying the concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" found in Article 1105 with respect to treatment "in addition
or beyond that" required under customary international law. 190
"This language represents an attempt to ensure that Chapter 11
panels are only allowed to consider what constitutes fair and equitable treatment within the context of NAFTA's Chapter 11 and a
limited series of norms that have been established in customary
international law." 19' The Parties did not choose phrases such as
"do [es] not consider" or "do [es] not entail" treatment in addition to
customary international law. Therefore, this gives a NAFTA tribunal some discretion in interpreting "gray areas" of customary
international law, but it also places more emphasis on interpreting those provisions of Chapter 11 with a focused scope and set of
parameters in mind. Consequently, the Metalclad Tribunal still
came to a justifiable holding with respect to its finding that Mexico had not treated Metalclad fairly from a customary international perspective.
The clarification also addresses when a Chapter 11 tribunal
has made a determination that there has been a breach of another
provision of NAFTA. 192 In this circumstance, the clarification
explicitly states this "does not establish that there has been a
188. U.S., Canada,Mexico Agree to Clarify NAFTA's Investor-State Provision, 19:31
U.S. TRADE, Aug. 3, 2001, at 21 [hereinafter Clarify NAFTA].
189. WTO, Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, supra note
185.
190. Interpretation of Chapter 11, supra note 186, § B(2).
191. Clarify NAFTA, supra note 188, at 22.
192. Interpretation of Chapter 11, supra note 186, § B(3).
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breach of Article 1105(1)."1 13 Importantly, the holding made by
the Metalclad Tribunal additionally survives this limitation, for
although the Tribunal found a breach in another provision of
NAFTA (Chapter 18), it also found a breach under Article 1105.
The Tribunal found a breach of Article 1105 because it interpreted
principles of transparency and procedural fairness found scattered
throughout the entire NAFTA text to be within Article 1105 as
well. Needless to say, "[a] determination that there has been a
breach of another provision of the NAFTA ... does not establish
that there has been a breach of Article 1105. "194 However, it also
does not necessarily establish that there has not been a breach of
Article 1105.
Although it is apparent in the clarification that the Parties
finally got their wish to narrow private investment protections
under the provisions of Chapter 11, "it will be difficult to assess
the impact of the clarification until it is actually applied by panelists in disputes."195 Thus, as of the time of this note's completion,
there has been no further published commentary or tribunal interpretation of the clarification regarding Chapter 11 to engender
any further discussion as it relates to the Metalclad dispute.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

It is evident that Justice Tysoe substituted his opinion for
that of the Tribunal's because he felt that the Tribunal's "error"
was so fundamental and beyond the scope submitted for arbitration that the Tribunal overstepped its boundaries to make the
finding it did under Article 1105 of Chapter 11. As a result, the
message sent by the B.C. Supreme Court's overruling is that
NAFTA Parties, by arguing that they are not required under
Chapter 11 to provide compensation when they fail to act in a fair
or transparent manner, will certainly instill concern for private
investors with foreign investment interests in any of the Parties
within NAFTA. This attitude, displayed by NAFTA Parties and
expressed in the clarification, if left unchecked, is not likely to
"increase substantially investment opportunities"19 6 or "ensure a
predictable commercial framework for business planning and
investment."19 7 On the other hand, the B.C. Supreme Court's deci193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
Clarify NAFTA, supra note 188, at 21.
NAFTA, supra note 78, art. 102(1).
Id. at pmbl.
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sion may not be a great concern for investors arguing their case
before international tribunals because its holdings are limited in
their precidential authority only to Canadian courts, and may
have virtually no value in the international context. As mentioned in the beginning of this note, international law is argued
before international arbitrators, and an opinion by the B.C.
Supreme Court regarding what it thinks "customary international
law" should mean may not be very significant to most international scholars and arbitrators when deciding future NAFTA
Chapter 11 controversies.
To conclude, when viewed in isolation, the Metalclad Appeal
to the B.C. Supreme Court appears to be a victory for the private
investor against interference from NAFTA Parties because Justice
Tysoe predominantly upheld the Tribunal's monetary damages
figure. However, when viewed in its historical context, the opinion's relevance is not so clear. Undoubtedly, time will tell whether
Justice Tysoe's opinion will influence other Chapter 11 tribunals
to interpret NAFTA categorically and in isolation or whether the
opinion will take a back seat to the analysis of arbitral tribunal
decisions that precede and succeed it. Either way, "the biggest
losers of all [are] the people of Mexico who continue to have to live
in a country that produces ten million tons of hazardous waste a
19
year and has only one facility in the whole country to handle it." 8
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